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Abstract
This paper considers the Nash implementation problem in which the planner
does not know individuals’ state-contingent choices that may involve violations
of rationality. In economic environments with at least three individuals, we
show that the planner may Nash implement a social choice correspondence while
extracting information about individuals’ state-contingent choices from the soci-
ety whenever one of the individuals, whose identity is not necessarily known to
the planner and the other individuals, is a weak sympathizer. Such an agent is
weakly inclined toward truthful revelation of individuals’ state-contingent choices
but not the “true” state. Then, in every Nash equilibrium of the mechanism we
design, all individuals except one truthfully reveal the same information about
individuals’ choices.
Keywords: Nash Implementation; Behavioral Implementation; Consistency; Par-
tial Honesty; Information Extraction.
JEL Classification: C72; D71; D78; D82; D90
∗We would like to thank Semih Koray, Asher Wolinsky, and Kemal Yıldız for discussions and
comments. Any remaining errors are ours.
†FASS, Sabancı University; ozanaltun@sabanciuniv.edu
‡Corresponding Author, FASS, Sabancı University; barlo@sabanciuniv.edu
§Department of Economics, Bilkent University; dalkiran@bilkent.edu.tr
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 A motivating example 7
3 Notations, definitions, and preliminaries 10
4 Three or more individuals 17
A A necessity result with Nash∗ implementation 24
B Proofs 25
B.1 The proof of Theorem 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B.2 The proof of Lemma 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
B.3 The proof of Theorem 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
C Two individuals 31
C.1 An example with two individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
References 42
List of Tables
1 The outcome function of the mechanism with three or more individuals. . . . . . . . 26
2 The outcome function of the mechanism with two individuals. . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 Individual choices of Ann and Bob. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4 The two-individual consistent profiles of sets: SII(f) = {S,S′, S˜, Sˆ}. . . . . . . . . . 41
1 Introduction
The analysis of the design of mechanisms the equilibria of which coincide with
a given social goal is essential to economic theory. The seminal works of Maskin
(1999, circulated in 1977), Moore and Repullo (1990), and Dutta and Sen (1991) deal
with this question under complete information: the situation when payoff-relevant
characteristics is commonly known within the society but not to the planner.1 de
Clippel (2014) extends this analysis to cases in which individuals’ behavior does not
necessarily satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP), generally regarded
as representing rationality.
The condition at the heart of the desired characterization turns out to be consis-
tency, a notion that implies the well-known Maskin monotonicity when individuals’
behavior satisfies the WARP.2 The opportunity sets sustained by the mechanism that
implements a given social goal, subsets of alternatives that an individual can obtain
by changing his messages while others’ remain the same, form a profile of sets con-
sistent with this social goal. Moreover, the existence of a consistent profile of choice
sets allows us to modify the canonical mechanism (by using this profile as opportunity
sets) to obtain a sufficiency result.3 Checking whether or not a given profile of sets is
consistent with a social choice rule requires that the planner know the choices of each
individual at each state from the corresponding member of that profile. The planner
is then able to elicit the information concerning the state from the society via the
canonical mechanism.
What if the planner does not know individuals’ state-contingent choices? Can he
1For more on implementation under complete information, see Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002), Palfrey
(2002), and Serrano (2004). On the other hand, Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and
Srivastava (1987), and Jackson (1991) analyze the case of incomplete information.
2Given individuals’ choice behavior, a profile of subsets of alternatives where each subset is indexed
for an individual and a state and a socially optimal alternative at that state, is said to be consistent
with a social choice correspondence if (i) for every individual and every state and every socially
optimal alternative in that state, this alternative is chosen at that state by that individual from the
corresponding choice set, and (ii) an alternative being socially optimal in the first state, but not in
the second, implies that there exists an individual who does not choose that alternative at the second
state from the choice set indexed for that individual and that alternative and the first state.
3See Maskin (1999) and de Clippel (2014).
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learn individuals’ choices as he attempts to elicit information about the state?
The current paper considers full implementation under complete information al-
lowing, but not insisting on, violations of rationality with the additional feature that
the planner does not know individuals’ state-contingent choices. Our main result is
that in economic environments with at least three individuals, the planner may Nash
implement a social choice correspondence (SCC) possessing a consistent profile of sets
by also eliciting the information concerning consistency from the society whenever one
of the individuals (whose identity is not necessarily known to the planner and the other
individuals) is a weak sympathizer. In every Nash equilibrium, all individuals save one
announce the same consistent profile of sets. Thus, the planner no longer needs to
know the societal choice topography, the state-contingent choice behavior of individ-
uals from every possible subset of alternatives, to identify a profile of sets consistent
with the given SCC. He can simply ask the individuals, knowing that all but one will
truthfully announce the same profile of sets consistent with the social goal. We provide
a tangible display of these by presenting a motivating example in which the hypothesis
of our main result holds.
We attain the notion of sympathy by modifying partial honesty of Dutta and Sen
(2012) so that it involves only announcements of profiles of sets and not the states of
the world. Restricting our attention to mechanisms that involve the announcement of
a profile of sets enables us to introduce a weak sympathizer : an individual who strictly
prefers the truthful revelation of a consistent profile of sets coupled with some messages
whenever none of his lies (announcements of inconsistent profiles of sets) makes him
strictly better off while he keeps on using the same remaining parts of his messages.
Indeed, a weak sympathizer is not a snitch or an informer in the sense that he does
not feel any obligation and/or inclination to reveal the state of the economy; instead,
he serves the planner as a guide without asking for compensation of any sort.
The economic environment assumption requires that individuals’ choices are not
perfectly aligned: for any alternative and for any state, there exist two individuals who
do not choose that alternative in that state from the set of all alternatives. Therefore,
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it demands that there is some weak form of disagreement in the society at every state.4
We provide comprehensive robustness checks for our main result and attain two
additional sufficiency results.
The first involves replacing the economic environment assumption with other condi-
tions such as the no-veto property while continuing to work with three or more individ-
uals. What we obtain is a choice version of condition µ of Moore and Repullo (1990),
in line with condition λ of Korpela (2012), and the strong consistency of de Clippel
(2014). This enables us to provide another sufficiency result similar to those in these
papers with the additional feature that the information about consistency is extracted
from the society when the environment features societal non-satiation and contains at
least two sympathizers the identities of whom are privately known to themselves, but
not the planner.
Societal non-satiation demands that for every alternative and every state, there
exists an individual who does not choose that alternative at that state from the set of
all alternatives. This restriction is weaker than the economic environment assumption
and allows for more Nash equilibria in the mechanism we employ. But, with more
Nash equilibria to handle comes the need for more power: instead of a single weak
sympathizer, now we need at least two sympathizers. A sympathizer is an individual
who strictly prefers a message profile consisting of the announcement of a consistent
profile of sets and the rest of his messages whenever none of his deviations, consisting
of lies (announcements of inconsistent profiles) coupled with some other messages, can
make him strictly better off. Therefore, every sympathizer is a weak sympathizer.
The second robustness check involves the case of two individuals. Because “the two-
agent model is the leading case for applications to contracting or bargaining” (Moore &
Repullo, 1990), this particular robustness check also has an intrinsic stand-alone value.
Our two-individual sufficiency result requires that both of the individuals are sympa-
thizers, and a slightly stronger version of the two-individual necessity condition (in
line with condition µ2 of Moore and Repullo (1990) and condition β of Dutta and Sen
4Our economic environment assumption is in line with the one in Kartik and Tercieux (2012), and
weaker than that in Jackson (1991) and Bergemann and Morris (2008).
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(1991)) holds. Vaguely put, the novel requirement in our sufficiency condition demands
that the requirements that appear in the two-individual necessity condition hold across
any pair of profiles of sets each satisfying the two-individual necessity condition. To
exhibit the practicality of our two-individual sufficiency result, we present an example
concerning a social goal that seeks compromise; we show that the hypothesis of this
result is satisfied.
In the standard approach to the implementation problem, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the set of states and the payoff-relevant characteristics of the
environment. Thus, the planner knows individuals’ choices contingent on any given
state. But he does not know the realized state. In our setup, the critical difference is
that the planner does not know individuals’ state-contingent choices. Hence, as far as
the planner’s knowledge is concerned, the set of states is not necessarily in one-to-one
correspondence with the payoff-relevant characteristics.
To exhibit our contributions within the framework of the standard approach, we
offer the following interpretation: As in the standard setting, the set of feasible states is
in one-to-one correspondence with the possible payoff-relevant characteristics. Indeed,
one can easily construct the set of all possible choice/preference profiles using the set of
alternatives. On the other hand, not all feasible states can emerge in our environment.
The states that can emerge form the set of prevailing states. In other words, the
support of the distribution determining whether or not a state can emerge equals the
set of prevailing states. Meanwhile, the SCC maps the states of the economy into
non-empty subsets of alternatives. The set of feasible states and how it corresponds
to payoff-relevant characteristics, the set of states of the economy, and the SCC are
common knowledge among the individuals and the planner. But, how the states of the
economy correspond to payoff-relevant characteristics is not known to the planner, yet
it is common knowledge among the agents.
As a result, the planner seeks to implement a social goal contingent on the states
of the economy even though he does not know individuals’ preferences/choices corre-
sponding to those states. That is why, the planner can be viewed as an outsider who
4
is delegated the responsibility of implementing the social goal at hand.5
The states of the economy may also arise due to categorization: The feasible states
are clustered into classes based on some criteria, and the social goal and the planner
adopt these classes. For example, in a society with n individuals where n ≥ 3 and
n is odd, each agent’s state is either 0 or 1 (where 0 stands for the bad state and 1
for the good state) resulting in the set of feasible states {0, 1}n. The social goal and
the planner adopt the categorization saying that the aggregate state of the economy
is ‘good’ if more than half of the individuals’ states are 1 and otherwise it is ‘bad’.
The planner seeks to implement a social goal contingent on the aggregate state of
the economy, ‘good’ or ‘bad’, while he does not know individuals’ preferences/choices
corresponding to these states.
This example also shows that our construction cannot be interpreted as a domain
restriction. To see this, consider the states of the economy specified above. Then, the
union of the feasible states corresponding to the ‘good’ aggregate state of the economy
and those corresponding to the ‘bad’ equals the set of all feasible states.
Identification of a mechanism that implements a social goal on the set of all feasible
states ensures that the revelation of the realized state is equivalent to the revelation
of individuals’ preferences/choices at that state. Moreover, the same mechanism im-
plements any restriction of that social goal on a smaller set of states, and hence, this
equivalence continues to hold on this set of states as well. Therefore, our results
are most useful when the social goal is not implementable on the set of all feasible
states. When the social goal is implementable on the set of all feasible states by a
‘grand’ mechanism, our results display that we can replace this mechanism (possibly
on grounds of complexity) and use ours defined solely on a smaller set of states of the
economy with the novel feature of asking the society the information concerning their
preferences/choices.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on implementation with partial honesty,
5For example, the planner could be an implementation consulting agency (e.g., McKinsey Imple-
mentation (McKinsey, 2018)) responsible to elicit information about the financial and operational
state of a client firm to implement a given policy contingent on this information that results in a
strategic interaction among subdivisions within the firm. Or the planner could be a court-appointed
trustee authorized to run a company during its bankruptcy proceedings.
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pioneered by Dutta and Sen (2012).6, 7 Their construction assumes that at least one of
the individuals has a preference for honesty. To formulate this, individuals’ preferences
on alternatives are extended to messages when dealing with mechanisms that involve
the announcement of a state. A partially honest individual is assumed to strictly prefer
a message involving the announcement of the ‘true’ state of the world when none of
his deviations make him strictly better off. Then, that study shows that all SCCs
satisfying the no-veto property can be implemented in Nash equilibrium whenever
the society contains at least three individuals one of whom, whose identity is privately
known only by himself, is partially honest. This sufficiency result does not need Maskin
monotonicity.
Sympathy involves an inclination toward the revelation of consistent profiles of
choice sets and not truthful announcements of the states. That is why, unlike the
majority of papers on implementation with partial honesty, we need a Maskin mono-
tonicity type of requirement to extract information about the states of the world.
Our analysis allows for individuals’ choices to violate the WARP and hence is related
to behavioral implementation literature. The two papers in line with ours are Korpela
(2012) and de Clippel (2014).8 These papers provide necessary as well as sufficient
conditions for (behavioral) Nash implementation when individuals display systematic
deviations from rationality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present a motivating example in
Section 2, the notations and definitions and some preliminary results in Section 3. Our
main result and its first robustness check are in Section 4. Section C of the Appendix
6An incomplete list of papers in this literature consists of Matsushima (2008a), Matsushima
(2008b), Kartik and Tercieux (2012), Kartik, Tercieux, and Holden (2014), Korpela (2014), Saporiti
(2014), Ortner (2015), Dog˘an (2017), Kimya (2017), Lombardi and Yoshihara (2017), Mukherjee,
Muto, and Ramaekers (2017), Lombardi and Yoshihara (2018), Savva (2018), and Lombardi and
Yoshihara (2019). See also Dutta (2019) for a survey of recent results in this literature.
7Another strand of related papers in the rational domain analyzes the characterization of jurors’
preferences on rankings of contestants when jurors are not necessarily impartial and have incentives
to misreport the true ranking of contestants. See Amoro´s (2009) and Amoro´s (2013). Yadav (2016)
considers the effects of partial honesty in the model of Amoro´s (2013).
8Hurwicz (1986), Eliaz (2002), Barlo and Dalkiran (2009), Saran (2011), Saran (2016), Koray and
Yildiz (2018), and Barlo and Dalkiran (2019) are among the papers presenting an analysis when the
society is not necessarily composed of individuals whose choice behavior satisfies the WARP.
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deals with the case of two individuals. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 A motivating example
Suppose that there are three individuals, denoted by N = {1, 2, 3}. The set of
alternatives pertinent to implementation is X = {a, b, c}.
We assume it is common knowledge among the individuals and the planner that
individuals’ choices can be represented by strict preferences (asymmetric and negatively
transitive binary relations).9 Therefore, we face 63 contingencies, each corresponding to
a possible preference profile. If all of them were to be seen as possible, the set of feasible
states would be Ω = {(P1, P2, P3) : Pi ∈ {abc, acb, bac, bca, cab, cba}, i = 1, 2, 3}, with
xyz denoting the strict preference order where x is strictly preferred to y and y to z
with x, y, z ∈ {a, b, c} and x 6= y and x 6= z and y 6= z.
If it were to be common knowledge about this environment that, in addition to the
above, the best alternative of each individual is distinct and there is strong conflict of
interest between individuals 1 and 3 (meaning that individual 1’s top-ranked alternative
must be individual 3’s bottom-ranked and vice versa) then the set of admissible states
would be
Ω∗ = {(abc, bac, cba), (abc, bca, cba), (acb, cab, bca), (acb, cba, bca), (bac, abc, cab),
(bac, acb, cab), (bca, cba, acb), (bca, cab, acb), (cab, acb, bac), (cab, abc, bac),
(cba, bca, abc), (cba, bac, abc)} ⊂ Ω. (1)
In our example, we suppose that the planner knows that only two of the admissible
states may prevail. But, he does not know which two. We model this by letting the
states of the economy be denoted by Θ = {θ, θ′}. Then, the individuals (but not the
planner) know that θ corresponds to (abc, bac, cba) and θ′ to (bac, acb, cab); we refer to
{(abc, bac, cba), (bac, acb, cab)} as the set of prevailing states. This can be sustained by
requiring that before the realization of the true state of the world, it becomes common
knowledge among the individuals that individual 1’s best alternative is not c, and
9A binary relation P ⊆ X×X is asymmetric if xPy implies not yPx; and, P is negatively transitive
if xPy implies either zPx or yPz for all z 6= x and z 6= y.
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individual 2’s preferences are either acb or bac; this piece of information is not known
to the planner.
We wish to note that the set of feasible states is in one-to-one correspondence with
all the possible preference profiles as in most of the implementation papers. However,
in many applications, as in this example, the set of states of the economy is not in
one-to-one correspondence with all the possible preference profiles.
The social choice goal to be implemented, f : Θ→ X, is given exogenously to the
planner and is as follows: f(θ) = b and f(θ′) = c. We wish to note that the planner
does not know the preference profile associated with the states of the economy, but
still has to implement this social choice function.
The following summarizes the knowledge and information requirements needed in
our example: It is common knowledge
(i) among the individuals and the planner that the set of individuals is {1, 2, 3}; the
set of feasible states is Ω = {(P1, P2, P3) : Pi ∈ {abc, acb, bac, bca, cab, cba}, i =
1, 2, 3}; the set of admissible states is Ω∗ as defined in equation (1); the set of
states of the economy is Θ = {θ, θ′}; the social choice function f : Θ → X such
that f(θ) = b and f(θ′) = c; and that each individual observes the realized state
of the economy θ˜ ∈ Θ; and
(ii) among the individuals that the set of individuals is {1, 2, 3}; the set of feasible
states is Ω = {(P1, P2, P3) : Pi ∈ {abc, acb, bac, bca, cab, cba}, i = 1, 2, 3}; the
set of admissible states is Ω∗ as defined in equation (1); the set of states of the
economy is Θ = {θ, θ′}; θ and θ′ correspond to the prevailing states (abc, bac, cba)
and (bac, acb, cab), respectively; the social choice function f : Θ → X such that
f(θ) = b and f(θ′) = c; and that each individual observes the realized state of
the economy θ˜ ∈ Θ; and
(iii) the planner knows that ‘the prevailing states corresponding to the states of the
economy θ and θ′ are common knowledge among the individuals.’
de Clippel (2014) establishes a necessary condition for Nash implementation when
individuals are not necessarily rational. This condition, consistency, is a notion that
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extends the well-known Maskin monotonicity to the domain when the individuals’
choices do not satisfy the WARP. In the current setting, consistency requires that
there are choice sets for every individual i = 1, 2, 3, at states θ and θ′, for alternative
b, which is f -optimal at θ, and for alternative c, f -optimal at θ′, such that there exists
an agent j ∈ {1, 2, 3} who does not choose b at θ′ from his choice set corresponding to
θ and b, and there is an individual k ∈ {1, 2, 3} not choosing c at θ from his choice set
associated with θ′ and c. That is, there is a profile of sets S = (Si(b, θ), Si(c, θ′))i=1,2,3
such that b ∈ Cθi (Si(b, θ)) and c ∈ Cθ′i (Si(c, θ′)) for all i = 1, 2, 3, while b /∈ Cθ′j (Sj(b, θ))
and c /∈ Cθk(Sk(c, θ′)) for some j, k = 1, 2, 3.
Let us start the identification of the consistent profile of choice sets of our example:
S1(b, θ): abc implies two possibilities for S1(b, θ): {b, c} and {b}.
S2(b, θ): bac implies four possibilities for S2(b, θ): {a, b, c}, {a, b}, {b, c}, and {b}.
S3(b, θ): cba results in two possibilities for S3(b, θ): {a, b} and {b}.
S1(c, θ
′): bac implies the requirement that S1(c, θ′) equals {c}.
S2(c, θ
′): acb implies two possibilities for S2(c, θ′): {b, c} and {c}.
S3(c, θ
′): cab results in four possibilities for S3(c, θ′): {a, b, c}, {a, c}, {b, c}, and {c}.
In addition to the above, b /∈ Cθ′2 ({b, c}) and c /∈ Cθ2({b, c}). Therefore, the profile
of sets S = (Si(b, θ), Si(c, θ
′))i=1,2,3 specified as follows is one of the profiles of sets
consistent with the social choice function f :
S1(b, θ) = {b, c} S1(c, θ′) = {c}
S2(b, θ) = {b, c} S2(c, θ′) = {b, c}
S3(b, θ) = {a, b} S3(c, θ′) = {a, b, c}.
The planner does not know individuals’ preferences in states θ and θ′, and hence,
cannot identify a profile of sets consistent with f in order to construct a mechanism
that implements f in Nash equilibrium.
What if the planner were to ask the individuals to reveal a profile of sets consistent
with f as a part of the mechanism?
In that regard, we consider mechanisms that require the announcement of a profile
of alleged choice sets along with some other actions. Indeed, the truthful revelation
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of a profile of choice sets consistent with the given SCC can be achieved when there
is a weak sympathizer in the society: an individual who strictly prefers to announce
a consistent profile and choose some messages whenever none of his lies (inconsistent
profiles of sets) makes him strictly better off while he keeps on using the same remaining
parts of his messages. A weak sympathizer is not a snitch or an informer, and does not
feel any obligation and/or inclination to reveal the state of the economy truthfully.
When it is commonly known among the individuals and the planner that the society
contains a weak sympathizer (the identity of whom is privately known only by himself)
our main result, Theorem 1, shows the following: in economic environments with at
least three individuals, the implementation of a social goal can be achieved while almost
unanimously eliciting information about a consistent profile of choice sets from the
society provided that there is such a profile.
The economic environment condition requires that, at any state, any one of the
alternatives should not be chosen from the set of all alternatives by at least two indi-
viduals. In our example, this condition holds because individuals’ choices from {a, b, c}
are such that at θ, alternative a is not chosen by individuals 2 and 3, b by 1 and 3, and
c by 1 and 2; while at θ′, alternative a is not chosen by individuals 1 and 3, b by 2 and
3, and c by 1 and 2.
Therefore, Theorem 1 applies, and it implies that the social choice function of our
example can be implemented while eliciting the relevant information pertaining to
individuals’ state-contingent choices.
3 Notations, definitions, and preliminaries
Let X be a set of alternatives, and X the set of all nonempty subsets of X. N =
{1, ..., n} denotes a society with a finite set of individuals where n ≥ 2.
Ω denotes the finite set of all feasible states of the world and it is assumed to be in
one-to-one correspondence with all the payoff-relevant characteristics of the environ-
ment. Indeed, one may derive this set of states using the set of alternatives X. The
distribution on Ω determining the realized state is denoted by φ where for any ω ∈ Ω,
φ(ω) ∈ [0, 1] identifies the probability that ω occurs. In many economic applications
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of interest, one may consider an interim set of states, a set of admissible states of the
world which we denote by Ω∗. Naturally, Ω∗ ⊆ Ω. The set of prevailing states is given
by ΩP := supp(φ) = {ω ∈ Ω : φ(ω) 6= 0}. We assume that ΩP ⊂ Ω∗.10
To model the information/knowledge formalities, we adopt the following: Let Θ be
the set of states of the economy defined with the requirement that #Θ = #ΩP . The
bijection pi : Θ → ΩP is called the identification function where pi(θ) ∈ Ω∗ identifies
the particulars of the payoff-relevant characteristics associated with the state of the
economy θ ∈ Θ.11 As pi : Θ → ΩP is a bijection, we refer to a state of the economy θ
also as a prevailing state and to the set of the states of the economy Θ as the set of
prevailing states. When the meaning is clear, we refer to a prevailing state as a state.
An alternative interpretation involves the categorization/aggregation of admissible
states: Using a surjective categorization/aggregation function κ : Ω∗ → Θ where for
any admissible state ω ∈ Ω∗, κ(ω) is the category/aggregate state of ω in the set
categories/aggregate states, Θ (previously specified as the set of states of the econ-
omy). The identification function with categories/aggregation is an injective map-
ping υ : Θ → Ω∗ associating a given category/aggregate state θ ∈ Θ with the ‘true’
payoff-relevant characteristics υ(θ) ∈ Ω∗ with the requirement that for any ω ∈ Ω∗,
υ(κ(ω)) = ω. In what follows, we work with a given set of states of the economy Θ and
injective identification function pi : Θ→ Ω∗. Notwithstanding, by replacing the identi-
fication function pi with the identification function with categories/aggregation υ (while
selecting an appropriate categorization/aggregation function κ), one can interpret our
findings using the categorization/aggregation approach.
The (individual) choice of agent i ∈ N at a feasible state ω ∈ Ω is captured by
the choice correspondence Cωi : X → X with the feasibility requirement that for any
S ∈ X , Cωi (S) ⊂ S. Given alternative x ∈ X, individual i ∈ N , and feasible state
ω ∈ Ω, we refer to a set S ∈ X with x ∈ Cωi (S) as a choice set of individual i at
10Situations in which X and Ω are not finite and φ is a measurable distribution can be handled by
constructing a σ-algebra on Ω and insisting on some standard measurability requirements. To refrain
from technicalities, we restrict our attention to finite sets in this paper.
11A function ψ : X → Y is injective if it maps distinct elements of its domain, X, to distinct
elements in its range, Y ; it is surjective if for every element in its range, y ∈ Y , there is an element in
its domain, x ∈ X, with ψ(x) = y. A function ψ : X → Y is a bijection if it is injective and surjective.
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state ω for alternative x. The societal choice topography on Ω is given by the profile of
individual choice correspondences C(Ω) := (Cωi (S))i∈N, ω∈Ω, S∈X .
Under rationality, every individual’s choice correspondence satisfies the WARP at
every state of the world. So, for any given i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, there exists a reflexive,
complete, and transitive binary preference relation Rωi ⊆ X × X such that for any
x, y ∈ X, x Rωi y if and only if x ∈ Cωi ({x, y}).12 Therefore, for any given i ∈ N and
ω ∈ Ω and S ∈ X , we have that Cωi (S) = {x∗ ∈ S : x∗ Rωi y,∀y ∈ S}. See Sen (1971)
for the formal treatment. In what follows, we allow for violations of WARP.
A social choice correspondence (SCC) defined on the states of the economy is f :
Θ → X , a non-empty valued correspondence mapping Θ into X (i.e., f(θ) ∈ X for
every θ ∈ Θ). Given θ ∈ Θ, the set of alternatives f(θ) denotes the alternatives that
the planner desires to sustain at θ and are referred to as f -optimal alternatives at θ.
We restrict our attention to complete information. The information and knowledge
requirements of our model are as follows:
(i) N , X, Ω, Ω∗, C(Ω), Θ, f : Θ → X , and that ‘every individual observes the
realized state of the economy’ are common knowledge among the individuals and
the planner; and
(ii) N , X, Ω, Ω∗, C(Ω), Θ, the injection pi : Θ → Ω∗, f : Θ → X , and the realized
state of the economy θ ∈ Θ are common knowledge among the individuals; and
(iii) the planner knows that ‘the injective identification function pi : Θ→ Ω∗ is com-
mon knowledge among the individuals’.
The essence of the asymmetry of information/knowledge between the planner and the
individuals involves the identification function pi and the realized state of the economy
θ. Recall that pi : Θ → ΩP is a bijection and ΩP ⊂ Ω∗. Thus, pi : Θ → Ω∗ is an
injection.
The following is the notion of consistency (de Clippel, 2014):
12A binary relation R ⊆ X ×X is reflexive if for all x ∈ X, xRx; complete if for all x, y ∈ X either
xRy or yRx or both; and transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ X with xRy and yRz implies xRz.
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Definition 1. Given an SCC f : Θ→ X , a profile of sets S := (Si(x, θ))i∈N, θ∈Θ, x∈f(θ)
is consistent with f : Θ→ X if
(i) x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Si(x, θ)), for all i ∈ N and θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ); and
(ii) x ∈ f(θ) and x /∈ f(θ′) for some θ, θ′ ∈ Θ implies there is j ∈ N such that
x 6∈ Cpi(θ′)j (Sj(x, θ)).
S(f) denotes the set of all profiles of sets that are consistent with f .
In words, a profile of sets S is consistent with a given SCC f : Θ → X , if (i) the
set Si(x, θ) is a choice set of alternative x by individual i at state pi(θ), for every i ∈ N
and θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ); and (ii) if alternative x is f -optimal at state θ but not at
state θ′ for some θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, then there exists an individual j ∈ N such that x is not
chosen from Sj(x, θ) by j at pi(θ
′).
A mechanism µ = (A, g) assigns each individual i ∈ N a non-empty message space
Ai and specifies an outcome function g : A → X where A = ×j∈NAj. M denotes the
set of all mechanisms.
Given a mechanism µ ∈ M and a−i ∈ A−i := ×j 6=iAj, the opportunity set of
individual i pertaining to others’ message profile a−i in mechanism µ is O
µ
i (a−i) :=
g(Ai, a−i) where g(Ai, a−i) = {g(ai, a−i) : ai ∈ Ai}.
In our setup, a sympathizer of the social goal is assumed to be inclined toward
the truthful revelation of the societal choice topography to the planner. As mentioned
before, a sympathizer is not a snitch or an informer in the sense that he does not feel
any obligation and/or inclination to reveal the state of the economy, but serves the
planner as a guide (without asking for compensation of any sort). Our results show
that the revelation of the whole choice topography is not needed, and announcements
of profiles of sets consistent with the SCC f are sufficient for implementation. In other
words, we do not need all the information pertaining to individuals’ state-contingent
choice behavior in order to implement the SCC f . That is why, in what follows, we
restrict our attention to the truthful revelation of consistency.
As a result, one can assume the sympathizer is inclined toward truthful revelation
of consistency. To define this, we consider mechanisms in which one of the components
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of each individual’s message space involves the announcement of a profile of choice sets
indexed for i ∈ N , θ ∈ Θ, and x ∈ f(θ). We refer to such game forms as mechanisms
involving the announcement of a profile of choice sets and denote the set of such
mechanisms byM∗ ⊂M. To that regard, we let S denote the set of all profile of sets
of alternatives S = (Si(x, θ))i∈N, θ∈Θ, x∈f(θ) with the property that x ∈ Si(x, θ) for all
i ∈ N , θ ∈ Θ, x ∈ f(θ). Naturally, S(f) ⊂ S. As a result, the mechanism µ ∈ M∗ is
such that Ai := S ×Mi for each i ∈ N for some non-empty Mi and M := ×i∈NMi and
a generic message (alternatively, action) ai ∈ Ai is denoted by ai = (S(i),mi).
In what follows, we extend individuals’ choices on alternatives to choices on mes-
sages concerning mechanisms µ ∈M∗.
For any given µ ∈ M∗ and state ω ∈ Ω, the correspondence BRωi : A−i  Ai
identifies the individual choices of agent i on his message space Ai (i.e., BR
ω
i (a−i) ⊂ Ai
identifies i’s chosen messages at ω when others’ message profile is given by a−i). In
particular, if individual i is a standard economic agent who is not weakly inclined
toward consistency (i.e., not a weak sympathizer) at ω ∈ Ω, then for all a−i ∈ A−i,
ai ∈ BRωi (a−i) if and only if g(ai, a−i) ∈ Cωi (Oµi (a−i)).
Otherwise, the following must hold:
Definition 2. Given a mechanism µ ∈M∗, we say that individual i ∈ N is
1. weakly inclined toward consistency at a state ω ∈ Ω if for all a−i ∈ A−i,
(i) g((S(i),mi), a−i), g((S˜(i),mi), a−i) ∈ Cωi (Oµi (a−i)) with S(i) ∈ S(f), S˜(i) ∈
S \ S(f), and mi ∈ Mi implies (S(i),mi) ∈ BRωi (a−i) and (S˜(i),mi) /∈
BRωi (a−i); and
(ii) in all other cases, ai ∈ BRωi (a−i) if and only if g(ai, a−i) ∈ Cωi (Oµi (a−i)).
2. inclined toward consistency at a state ω ∈ Ω if for all a−i ∈ A−i,
(i) g((S(i),mi), a−i), g((S˜(i), m˜i), a−i) ∈ Cωi (Oµi (a−i)) with S(i) ∈ S(f), S˜(i) ∈
S \ S(f), and mi, m˜i ∈ Mi implies (S(i),mi) ∈ BRωi (a−i) and (S˜(i), m˜i) /∈
BRωi (a−i); and
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(ii) in all other cases, ai ∈ BRωi (a−i) if and only if g(ai, a−i) ∈ Cωi (Oµi (a−i)).
We call an individual weakly inclined toward consistency at a state ω ∈ Ω a weak
sympathizer at ω, and one who is inclined toward consistency at ω ∈ Ω a sympathizer
at ω.
The first part of Definition 2 says the following: Given mechanism µ, any one
of others’ actions a−i, and any state ω ∈ Ω, a weak sympathizer i at ω chooses to
announce a consistent profile of sets S(i) as well as a message profile mi; he does not
choose to announce an inconsistent profile S˜(i) and to select the same message profile
mi whenever both action profiles, (S
(i),mi) and (S˜
(i),mi), lead to alternatives which are
among those chosen by individual i at state ω from his opportunity set corresponding
to others’ behavior a−i (namely, O
µ
i (a−i)). On the other hand, the second part of
Definition 2 demands the following: Given mechanism µ, any of others’ actions a−i,
and state ω ∈ Ω, a sympathizer i at ω chooses to announce a consistent profile of sets
S(i) while selecting a message profile mi; he does not choose to announce an inconsistent
profile S˜(i) coupled with selecting some other message profile m˜i whenever both action
profiles, (S(i),mi) and (S˜
(i), m˜i), result in alternatives that are among the chosen by i
at ω from Oµi (a−i).
As a consequence, every individual inclined toward consistency at a state ω is
also weakly inclined toward consistency at ω. That is, every sympathizer is a weak
sympathizer. We employ the following sympathy properties in our results:
Definition 3. We say that the environment satisfies the weak-sympathizer property
if, for every admissible state ω ∈ Ω∗, there exits at least one weak sympathizer at ω.
Moreover, the sympathizer property holds if, for every admissible state ω ∈ Ω∗, there
are at least two sympathizers at ω. The identity of each (weak) sympathizer associated
with a given admissible state is privately known only by himself.
Given a mechanism µ ∈M , a∗ ∈ A constitutes a Nash equilibrium of µ at a state
θ ∈ Θ if a∗i ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (a∗−i)) for all i ∈ N . When attention is restricted to µ ∈ M∗,
we say that a∗ ∈ A is a Nash∗ equilibrium of µ at a state θ ∈ Θ if a∗i ∈ BRpi(θ)i (a∗−i)
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for all i ∈ N . We note that when there are no sympathizers, the two notions coincide.
Otherwise, the set of Nash∗ equilibrium of a mechanism might be a proper subset of
the set of Nash equilibrium of the same mechanism.
Nash implementability is defined as follows: an SCC f : Θ → X is (fully) imple-
mentable by a mechanism µ ∈M in Nash equilibrium if (i) for any θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ),
there exists ax ∈ A such that g(ax) = x and x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (ax−i)) for all i ∈ N ; and (ii)
for any θ ∈ Θ, a∗ ∈ A with g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (a∗−i)) for all i ∈ N implies g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
If an SCC f : Θ → X is implementable by a mechanism µ ∈ M in Nash equilib-
rium, we define the profile of sets sustained by µ as follows: Sµ := (Sµi (x, θ))i∈N, θ∈Θ, x∈f(θ)




−i) for any i ∈ N , θ ∈ Θ, and x ∈ f(θ) while ax ∈ A is such that
g(ax) = x and g(ax) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (ax−i)) for all i ∈ N .
The necessity result of de Clippel (2014) tells us that if an SCC f is Nash im-
plementable by a mechanism µ ∈ M, then Sµ ∈ S(f). That is, the profile of sets
sustained by µ is consistent with f .
On the other hand, the notion of Nash∗ implementation is the following:
Definition 4. We say that an SCC f : Θ→ X is (fully) implementable by a mecha-
nism µ ∈M in Nash∗ equilibrium, if
(i) for any θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ), there exists ax ∈ A such that g(ax) = x and
axi ∈ BRpi(θ)i (ax−i) for all i ∈ N ; and
(ii) for any θ ∈ Θ, a∗ ∈ A with a∗i ∈ BRpi(θ)i (a∗−i) for all i ∈ N implies g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
When the mechanism µ in this definition is in M \M∗, Nash∗ implementation
coincides with Nash implementation; being a (weak) sympathizer does not put any
additional restrictions on individuals’ choices.
In Appendix A, we present a necessity result with Nash∗ implementation.13 The
necessary condition we attain is not independent of the mechanism µ, and hence, it
is not helpful in constructing mechanisms that will be employed in the sufficiency
direction.
13This result shows that the necessary condition we obtain differs from consistency whenever the
mechanism Nash∗ implementing a given SCC, µ, is in M∗ and a (weak) sympathizer announces an
inconsistent profile of sets in a Nash∗ equilibrium.
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Some of our results adopt the following assumptions:
Definition 5. We say that the environment features societal non-satiation whenever,
for any admissible state ω ∈ Ω∗ and any alternative x ∈ X, there is an individual i ∈ N
such that x /∈ Cωi (X). Moreover, we say that the economic environment assumption
holds whenever, for any admissible state ω ∈ Ω∗ and any alternative x ∈ X, there are
two individuals i, j ∈ N with i 6= j such that x /∈ Cωi (X) ∪ Cωj (X).
The economic environment assumption implies societal non-satiation. The latter
requires that for any given admissible state, all individuals do not choose the same
alternative from the set of all alternatives at that state. The former demands that for
every admissible state and alternative, there are two individuals not choosing that al-
ternative from the set of all alternatives at that given state. The economic environment
assumption involves a weak form of disagreement among the society when selecting an
alternative from the set of all alternatives.
Next, we define the no-veto property:
Definition 6. We say that an SCC f : Θ → X satisfies the no-veto property if for
any θ ∈ Θ, x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X) for all i ∈ N \ {j} for some j ∈ N implies x ∈ f(θ).
This property demands that if an alternative is chosen from the set of all alternatives
at a state by every individual but one, then that alternative has to be f -optimal at
that state. Evidently, the welfare of the individual who does not agree with the rest
of the society is ignored in this notion.14 Moreover, we wish to note that the no-veto
property never applies in economic environments.
4 Three or more individuals
The following is the first of our sufficiency results for three or more individuals.
It utilizes a mechanism involving the announcement of a profile of choice sets and
extracting the desired information about consistency from the society.
14Benoit and Ok (2006) and Barlo and Dalkiran (2009) obtain full implementation results employing
a property called limited-veto-power, a weaker condition than the no-veto property.
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Theorem 1. Suppose n ≥ 3. Consider an economic environment satisfying the weak-
sympathizer property, and assume that the SCC f : Θ → X is such that S(f) 6= ∅.
Then, f is Nash∗ implementable by a mechanism µ ∈M∗. Furthermore, for any θ ∈ Θ,
in every Nash∗ equilibrium a¯ = (S¯(i), m¯i)i∈N ∈ A of mechanism µ at θ, S¯(i) = S for
some S ∈ S(f) for all i ∈ N \ {j} for some j ∈ N .
Theorem 1 provides a clear and useful message in economic environments satis-
fying the weak-sympathizer property: The relevant information about societal choice
topography can be elicited from individuals almost unanimously whenever there exists
a profile of sets consistent with that social goal. The identity of the weak sympathizer
associated with a given prevailing state is not known to the planner and the other
individuals.
The following is an implication of this theorem: If the set of prevailing states is
not in one-to-one correspondence with all the admissible payoff-relevant characteristics
of this environment (i.e., ΩP is a strict subset of Ω∗), the planner needs to ‘know’
individuals’ state-contingent choices to identify a consistent profile of choice sets. What
Theorem 1 implies is that the designer can learn the realized state, as well as the
relevant information about the societal choice topography from the individuals, using
the same mechanism whenever there is a profile of choice sets consistent with that social
goal. Thus, the economic environment assumption and the weak-sympathizer property
empower us to dispose of the planner’s need to know individuals’ state-contingent
choices whenever the social goal has a consistent profile of sets.
The existence of a profile of choice sets consistent with the given SCC f is akin to
a feasibility requirement: the necessity result tells us that S(f) = ∅ implies that f is
not Nash implementable. That is, Nash implementability of the SCC f is unattainable.
Thus, insisting on the existence of a consistent profile of sets in our theorem is natural.
On the other hand, if one was to restrict attention to the sufficiency direction, the
following concern may arise: How would the planner know if there is a profile of choice
sets consistent with the SCC he wishes to implement? This is a relevant question, as
the designer does not know individuals’ state-contingent choices. An auxiliary result
helps us deal with this issue: the planner infers that there is a profile of sets consistent
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with the SCC f whenever he knows that there is a larger set of states and an extension
of f onto that set such that this extension has a consistent profile of choice sets.
We can obtain a tangible display of this by considering the efficiency notion intro-
duced and analyzed by de Clippel (2014): The de Clippel efficient SCC is f eff : Ω→ X
and it is defined for any feasible state ω ∈ Ω by f eff(ω) := {x ∈ X | ∃Y :=
(Yi)i∈N with Yi ∈ X and x ∈ Cωi (Yi),∀i ∈ N, and ∪i∈N Yi = X}. It turns out that
f eff is Nash implementable on all domains Ω′ ⊂ Ω (de Clippel, 2014, Proposition 3).
Therefore, for any set of states of the economy Θ and injective identification function
pi : Θ → Ω∗, the planner, without knowing pi, infers that S(f eff |pi(Θ)) 6= ∅ where
S(f eff |pi(Θ)) = {S ∈ S : S = (Si(x, ω))i∈N, ω∈Ω, x∈feff(ω) such that pi−1(ω) ∈ Θ}. That
is, the designer deduces that, for any Θ and injective pi : Θ → Ω∗, the restriction of
f eff on pi(Θ) has a consistent profile of choice sets.
In fact, our auxiliary result establishes that existence of a profile of sets consistent
with an SCC f follows whenever there is a profile of sets consistent with an extension
of the SCC f onto the set of admissible states.
We need the following for our auxiliary result: given an SCC f : Θ → X and an
identification function pi : Θ→ Ω∗, an extension of f onto Ω∗ is an SCC fΩ∗ : Ω∗ → X
such that fΩ∗(pi(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Lemma 1. Suppose there exists an extension of the SCC f : Θ → X onto the set of
admissible states Ω∗, fΩ∗ : Ω∗ → X , such that fΩ∗ possesses a consistent profile of sets.
Then, S(f) 6= ∅.
Combining the necessity of Nash implementation and this lemma implies the fol-
lowing: S(f) 6= ∅ whenever there exists an extension of the SCC f : Θ → X onto Ω∗,
fΩ∗ : Ω
∗ → X , such that fΩ∗ is Nash implementable on the domain Ω∗. It is useful to
point out that the hypothesis of Lemma 1 does not involve the Nash implementability
of an extension of the given SCC on the domain of admissible states, but rather the
existence of a profile of sets consistent with an extension of the given SCC onto the
domain of admissible states. Indeed, the extension of f onto Ω∗, fΩ∗ , that may be used
in the lemma, may violate some needed properties (such as no-veto property and/or
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unanimity) at states ω ∈ Ω∗ \ ΩP ; consequently, the sufficiency result of de Clippel
(2014) may not apply to fΩ∗ .
As a result, using Lemma 1 we can restate our main result in the following corollary
presented without a proof:
Corollary 1. Suppose n ≥ 3. Consider an economic environment satisfying the weak-
sympathizer property, and assume that there exists an extension of the SCC f : Θ→ X
onto Ω∗, fΩ∗ : Ω∗ → X , which possesses a consistent profile of choice sets. Then,
f is Nash∗ implementable by a mechanism µ ∈ M∗. Moreover, for any θ ∈ Θ, in
every Nash∗ equilibrium a¯ = (S¯(i), m¯i)i∈N ∈ A of mechanism µ at θ, S¯(i) = S for some
S ∈ S(f) for all i ∈ N \ {j} for some j ∈ N .
Next, we analyze how to weaken the economic environment assumption specified
in Definition 5. To that regard, we need to discuss the construction of the mechanism
employed in the proof of Theorem 1. Our mechanism asks each individual i to choose
a feasible profile of choice sets S(i) ∈ S; a state of the economy θ(i) ∈ Θ; an alternative
x(i) ∈ X; a natural number k(i). Rule 1 decrees that if all but one individual announce
the same feasible profile of choice sets, S, while the remaining choices of all individuals
involve θ and x with x ∈ f(θ), then the outcome function equals x. On the other
hand, Rule 2 demands that the outcome equals x whenever all but one individual i′
announce the same feasible profile of choice sets, S, and the choices of all but one
individual j involve θ and x with x ∈ f(θ) while j chooses x′ and θ′ provided that x′
is not in the choice set Sj(x, θ) listed in the profile S. If x
′ were to be in the choice set
Sj(x, θ) listed in the profile S in the contingency discussed in the previous sentence,
then Rule 2 decrees that the outcome is x′. Rule 3 encompasses all the other situations
and involves the integer game: the outcome equals the alternative chosen by the agent
with the lowest index among those who choose the highest natural number.
The economic environment assumption dispenses with the Nash∗ equilibria that
may arise under Rules 2 and 3 as well as that under Rule 1. Equilibria that arise under
Rule 3 are not desirable because of the following: in an equilibrium under Rule 3, all
individuals apart from the sympathizers do not need to choose a consistent profile of
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sets. As a result, the relevant information about the societal choice topography cannot
be extracted in equilibrium from these individuals. Fortunately, societal non-satiation
is sufficiently strong to rule out such equilibria.
If we adopt societal non-satiation along with the no-veto property, then we allow for
some additional equilibria under Rules 1 and 2. Then, for any prevailing state, we need
at least two sympathizers. This is because our mechanism is such that when we deal with
an equilibrium at a prevailing state under Rules 1 or 2 in which all but one individual
announce the same profile of sets while the odd man out is announcing a different
profile, by changing his announcement concerning the profile, each agent different from
the odd man out can trigger Rule 3, and hence, obtain any alternative he desires by
also changing his integer choice. Because we need the equilibrium announcement of
the profile of sets by all but the odd man out to be consistent with the social goal, we
have to make sure that there is a sympathizer (at this state) among those announcing
the same profile; weak sympathy does not suffice as this agent also needs to change his
integer choice.15
In what follows, we provide the formal presentation and execution of the above-
discussed result by replacing the no-veto property with a weaker condition that is
inspired by condition µ of Moore and Repullo (1990) (alternatively, condition λ of
Korpela (2012)) and delivers a similar requirement as in de Clippel (2014). It says
that for any profile of choice sets consistent with the social goal the following must
hold: (i) an alternative x must be f -optimal at θ whenever it is chosen by all but one
individual at pi(θ) from the set of all alternatives while the odd man out chooses x
at some other state pi(θ′) from the choice set (associated with the consistent profile)
15The need to have an additional sympathizer is a novel point that does not appear in Dutta and
Sen (2012) and it is one of the reasons why they can conduct their analysis with only one partially
honest individual. They work in the rational domain where states are in one-to-one correspondence
with the payoff-relevant aspects and assume that a partially honest individual strictly prefers to reveal
the state truthfully when he is indifferent. To see why they do not need an additional partially honest
individual, consider the canonical mechanism without the announcement of a profile of choice sets
and a Nash equilibrium in which the rule that implies the opportunity sets of all but one individual,
i∗, equals X. Then, they do not need to guarantee that one of those individuals i 6= i∗ (different
from the odd man out i∗) is partially honest as the no-veto property delivers the desired conclusion.
However, in our case, we need to worry about “sympathy” to ensure that one of those individuals
i 6= i∗ is inclined toward the truthful revelation of a consistent profile of sets.
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corresponding to θ′ and some f -optimal alternative x′ in θ′; and (ii) the social goal has
to respect unanimity, meaning that if an alternative x is chosen by every individual at
a state pi(θ) from the set of all alternatives, then x has to be f -optimal at θ. The no-
veto property implies this condition. On the other hand, in an environment featuring
societal non-satiation, unanimity holds vacuously; thus, it can be dispensed with.
Now, we state our second sufficiency result. Indeed, this theorem can be regarded
as a robustness check for Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Suppose n ≥ 3. Consider an environment satisfying the sympathizer
property, and assume that the SCC f : Θ→ X is such that S(f) 6= ∅ and the following
hold: For any θ ∈ Θ,
(i) for any S ∈ S(f), x ∈ Cpi(θ)j (Sj(x′, θ′)) where j ∈ N , θ′ ∈ Θ, x′ ∈ f(θ′),
Sj(x
′, θ′) = S|j,x′,θ′, and x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X) for all i ∈ N \ {j} implies x ∈ f(θ); and
(ii) x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X) for all i ∈ N implies x ∈ f(θ).
Then, f is Nash∗ implementable by a mechanism µ ∈ M∗. Moreover, if the environ-
ment features societal non-satiation, then (ii) above can be dispensed with and for any
θ ∈ Θ, in every Nash∗ equilibrium aˆ = (Sˆ(i), mˆi)i∈N ∈ A of µ at θ, Sˆ(i) = S for some
S ∈ S(f) for all i ∈ N \ {j} for some j ∈ N .
It is straightforward to see that the no-veto property implies (i) and (ii) of the
hypothesis of Theorem 2. Therefore, we obtain the following immediate corollary:
Corollary 2. Suppose n ≥ 3. Consider an environment featuring societal non-satiation
and the sympathizer property, and assume that the SCC f : Θ → X is such that
S(f) 6= ∅ and satisfies the no-veto property. Then, f is Nash∗ implementable by a
mechanism µ ∈M∗ such that in every Nash∗ equilibrium aˆ = (Sˆ(i), mˆi)i∈N ∈ A of µ at
θ, Sˆ(i) = S for some S ∈ S(f) for all i ∈ N \ {j} for some j ∈ N .
Theorem 2 demands that there exists a profile of sets consistent with the SCC f
with some requirements that cannot be verified by the planner, who does not know in-
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dividuals’ state-contingent choices.16 However, using the arguments leading to Lemma
1 we can modify Corollary 2 (which uses the no-veto property instead of the hypothesis
of Theorem 2) to attain the conclusion that the planner infers S(f) 6= ∅ whenever he
knows that f has an extension that possesses a consistent profile of sets:17
Corollary 3. Suppose n ≥ 3. Consider an environment featuring societal non-satiation
and the sympathizer property, and assume that the SCC f : Θ→ X satisfies the no-veto
property and possesses an extension onto Ω∗, fΩ∗ : Ω∗ → X , which has a consistent
profile of sets. Then, f is Nash∗ implementable by a mechanism µ ∈ M∗ such that in
every Nash∗ equilibrium aˆ = (Sˆ(i), mˆi)i∈N ∈ A of µ at θ, Sˆ(i) = S for some S ∈ S(f)
for all i ∈ N \ {j} for some j ∈ N .
16Taking steps similar to those discussed following Theorem 1 does not suffice to ease the extent of
the information requirement of our hypothesis. Even with societal non-satiation, we cannot modify
Theorem 2 with a condition that demands that the planner knows that there exists an extension of
f onto the set of admissible states Ω∗, fΩ∗ : Ω∗ → X , such that for any profile of sets consistent
with fΩ∗ , denoted by SΩ∗ = (S
∗
i (x, ω))i∈N, ω∈Ω∗, x∈fΩ∗ (ω), it must be that x ∈ Cωj (S∗j (x′, ω′)) with
j ∈ N , ω′ ∈ Ω∗, x′ ∈ fΩ∗(ω′), and x ∈ Cωi (X) for all i ∈ N with i 6= j implies x ∈ fΩ∗(ω). However,
this is not sufficient as it does not empower us to ‘extend’ a profile of sets consistent with f , SΘ :=
(Si(x, θ))i∈N, θ∈Θ, x∈f(θ), to a profile of sets consistent with fΩ∗ , S¯Ω∗ = (S¯∗i (x, ω))i∈N, ω∈Ω∗, x∈fΩ∗ (ω),
such that Si(x, θ) = S¯
∗
i (x, pi(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ). As a result, what the planner needs to know
in addition to the above is: for all profiles of sets consistent with f , SΘ := (Si(x, θ))i∈N, θ∈Θ, x∈f(θ),
there exists a profile of sets consistent with fΩ∗ , S¯Ω∗ = (S¯
∗
i (x, ω))i∈N, ω∈Ω∗, x∈fΩ∗ (ω), such that
Si(x, θ) = S¯
∗
i (x, pi(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ). So, the addition of this condition does not help ease
the need for the designer to know individuals’ state-contingent choices.
17If the extension of f onto the set of admissible states, Ω∗, satisfies the no-veto property, then the
planner infers that f satisfies the no-veto property on the set of states of the economy, Θ, as well.
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Appendix
A A necessity result with Nash∗ implementation
Using Definition 2 delivers the following necessity result for Nash∗ implementation
under weak sympathy. This result also applies to the case under sympathy because
every sympathizer is a weak sympathizer. However, the necessity condition we obtain
is not independent of the mechanism that Nash∗ implements the SCC at hand.
Proposition 1. Suppose an SCC f : Θ→ X is Nash∗ implementable by a mechanism
µ ∈ M. If µ ∈ M \M∗, then there exists a consistent profile of sets with f . On the
other hand, if µ ∈M∗, then there exists a profile of sets Sµ := (Sµi (x, θ))i∈N, θ∈Θ, x∈f(θ)
such that
(i) x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Sµi (x, θ)) for all i ∈ N , θ ∈ Θ, and x ∈ f(θ); and
(ii) x ∈ f(θ) and x /∈ f(θ′) for some θ, θ′ ∈ Θ implies there is j ∈ N such that
(ii.1) either j is not a weak sympathizer at state pi(θ′) and x /∈ Cpi(θ′)j (Sµj (x, θ));
(ii.2) or j is a weak sympathizer at state pi(θ′) with x ∈ Cpi(θ′)j (Sµj (x, θ)) and




j (x, θ)) and
(ii.2.b) for all S˜ ∈ S(f), we have that g((S˜,mxj ), ax−j) /∈ Cpi(θ)j (Sµj (x, θ)) when-
ever j is a weak sympathizer at pi(θ)
where ax = (S(i),x,mxi )i∈N ∈ A is such that g(ax) = x and axi ∈ BRpi(θ)i (ax−i).
Proof. The existence of a consistent profile of sets follows from de Clippel (2014)
when µ ∈ M \M∗. Now, suppose µ ∈ M∗. Let Sµ := (Sµi (x, θ))i∈N, θ∈Θ, x∈f(θ) with




−i) for any i ∈ N , θ ∈ Θ, and x ∈ f(θ), where ax = (S(i),x,mxi )i∈N ∈ A
is such that g(ax) = x and axi ∈ BRpi(θ)i (ax−i), i.e., ax is a Nash∗ equilibrium associated
with alternative x ∈ f(θ).
Then, (i) of the proposition follows from (i) of Nash∗ implementation.
For (ii), suppose that x ∈ f(θ) and x /∈ f(θ′) for some θ, θ′ ∈ Θ. Then, we need to




−j) because otherwise a
x would be Nash∗ at θ′,
and hence, x ∈ f(θ′) by (ii) of Nash∗ implementation; a contradiction.
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If j is not a weak sympathizer at pi(θ′), then (ii.1) of the proposition follows.
If j is a weak sympathizer at pi(θ′) with x ∈ Cpi(θ′)j (Sµj (x, θ)), then this coupled




−j) implies that S







j (x, θ)), because otherwise we would obtain a contradiction
to j being a weak sympathizer at pi(θ′).18 Also, if j were to be a weak sympathizer at
pi(θ), x ∈ f(θ) and ax being Nash∗ at θ requires that g((S˜,mxj ), ax−j) /∈ Cpi(θ)j (Sµj (x, θ))
for all S˜ ∈ S(f) since S(j),x /∈ S(f) and x ∈ Cpi(θ)j (Sµj (x, θ)).
B Proofs
B.1 The proof of Theorem 1
The construction featured in the proof utilizes the following mechanism µ ∈ M∗
with µ = (A, g) defined as follows: Ai := S × Θ × X × N where a generic member
ai = (S
(i), θ(i), x(i), k(i)) ∈ Ai with S(i) ∈ S, θ(i) ∈ Θ, x(i) ∈ X, and k(i) ∈ N with the
convention that mi = (θ
(i), x(i), k(i)) and Mi := Θ ×X × N. The outcome function is
defined via the Rules specified in Table 1.
The proof is presented via two claims. The first establishes (i) of Nash∗ implemen-
tation holds, while the second delivers (ii) of Nash∗ implementation.
Claim 1. For all θ ∈ Θ and for all x ∈ f(θ), define ax ∈ A by axi = (S, θ, x, 1) with
S ∈ S(f). Then, axi ∈ BRpi(θ)i (ax−i) for all i ∈ N and g(ax) = x.
Proof. Rule 1 applies and g(ax) = x. As S(i) = S for all i ∈ N , the individual
deviations can only result in Rules 1 and 2. Hence, Oµi (a
x
−i) = Si(x, θ). Thus, if i is not
a weak sympathizer at state pi(θ), then (i) of consistency saying that x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Si(x, θ))
is equivalent to axi ∈ BRpi(θ)i (ax−i). If i is a weak sympathizer at pi(θ), then S ∈ S(f)
and x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Si(x, θ)) (due to (i) of consistency) imply axi ∈ BRpi(θ)i (ax−i).
18Here, individual j announces an inconsistent profile of sets, S(j),x, in the Nash∗ equilibrium
sustaining alternative x at state θ in mechanism µ ∈ M∗ even though he is a weak sympathizer at
state pi(θ). This displays that information extraction concerning the choice topography and the state
demands the construction of the right mechanism because a weak sympathizer is not obliged to reveal
the realized state and/or refrain from manipulating the outcome via inconsistent announcements.
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Rule 1 : g(a) = x
if S(i) = S for all i ∈ N \ {i′}
for some i′ ∈ N, and
mj = (θ, x, ·) for all j ∈ N
with x ∈ f(θ),
Rule 2 : g(a) =

x′
if x′ ∈ Sj(x, θ)
and Sj(x, θ) = S |j,x,θ,
x otherwise.
if S(i) = S for all i ∈ N \ {i′}
for some i′ ∈ N, and
mi = (θ, x, ·) for all i ∈ N \ {j}
with x ∈ f(θ), and
mj = (θ
′, x′, ·) 6= (θ, x, ·),
Rule 3 : g(a) = x(i
∗) where otherwise.
i∗ = min{j ∈ N : k(j) ≥ maxi′∈N k(i′)}
Table 1: The outcome function of the mechanism with three or more individuals.
Claim 2. If a∗ ∈ A is a Nash∗ equilibrium of µ ∈M∗ at some θ ∈ Θ, then g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
That is, a∗ ∈ A such that a∗i ∈ BRpi(θ)i (a∗−i) for all i ∈ N for some θ ∈ Θ implies
g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
Proof. Consider a Nash∗ equilibrium a∗ at θ under Rule 1 such that a∗i = (S
′, θ′, x′, k′)




′, θ′) for all i ∈ N due to Rule 1 and Rule 2.
Notice that S′ ∈ S(f). Because, otherwise, S′ /∈ S(f) and letting i be the weak sym-





S(f) and m∗i = (θ′, x′, k′) implies g(S′′,m∗i , a∗−i) = g(a∗) = x′ ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Si(x′, θ′)) (due
to a∗i ∈ BRpi(θ)i (a∗−i) implying x′ = g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (a∗−i)) and Oµi (a∗−i) = Si(x′, θ′))
while (S′′,m∗i ) ∈ BRpi(θ)i (a∗−i) and (S′,m∗i ) /∈ BRpi(θ)i (a∗−i), a contradiction to a∗ being
a Nash∗ equilibrium at θ.
Assume that x′ /∈ f(θ) or else the proof concludes. Because that x′ ∈ f(θ′) and




′, θ′)). Recall that Oµj (a
∗
−j) = Sj(x
′, θ′). The desired contradiction is achieved
because then x′ /∈ Cpi(θ)j (Sj(x′, θ′)) implies a∗j /∈ BRpi(θ)j (a∗−j).
Another type of Nash∗ equilibrium a∗ at θ under Rule 1 is one where there exists an
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individual i′ such that a∗i′ = (S
′′, θ′, x′, k′) whereas a∗i = (S
′, θ′, x′, k′) for all i ∈ N \ {i′}
with S′ 6= S′′. Then, by Rule 1 and Rule 3, Oµi (a∗−i) = X for all i ∈ N \ {i′} as any one
of i 6= i′ could deviate to ai = (S, θ′, y, k) with S 6= S′, y ∈ X and k > k′. Since a∗ is a
Nash∗ equilibrium at θ, we observe that g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X) for all i 6= i′, a contradiction
to the economic environment assumption.
Next, we establish that there cannot be a Nash∗ equilibrium under Rule 2 or 3.
Consider any Nash∗ equilibrium a¯ ∈ A under either Rule 2 or 3 in order to obtain
a contradiction. In both of the cases, Oµj (a¯−j) = X for at least n − 1 individuals j
and a¯i ∈ BRpi(θ)i (a¯−i) for all i ∈ N implies for at least n − 1 individuals j we have
g(a¯) ∈ Cpi(θ)j (X). This is not possible due to the economic environment assumption.
B.2 The proof of Lemma 1
By hypothesis, we have that pi(Θ) ⊂ Ω∗; fΩ∗ : Ω∗ → X is such that fΩ∗(pi(θ)) = f(θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ. Let SΩ∗ := (S∗i (x, ω))i∈N, ω∈Ω∗, x∈fΩ∗ (ω) be a profile of sets consistent with
fΩ∗ : (i) it must be that x ∈ Cωi (S∗i (x, ω)) for all i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω∗ and x ∈ fΩ∗(ω); and
(ii) having x ∈ fΩ∗(ω) and x /∈ fΩ∗(ω′) with ω, ω′ ∈ Ω∗ implies there is j ∈ N such that
x /∈ Cω′j (S∗j (x, ω)). Define SΘ := (Si(x, θ))i∈N, θ∈Θ, x∈f(θ) with Si(x, θ) := S∗i (x, pi(θ))
for all i ∈ N and θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ).
Then, as f(θ) = fΩ∗(pi(θ)) and pi(Θ) ⊂ Ω∗, x /∈ Cpi(θ
′)
j (Sj(x
′, θ′)) for some j ∈ N
and θ′ ∈ Θ and x′ ∈ f(θ′) implies x /∈ Cpi(θ′)j (S∗j (x′, pi(θ′))) for j ∈ N and pi(θ′) ∈ Ω∗
and x′ ∈ fΩ∗(pi(θ′)). Thus, SΘ satisfies (i) of consistency.
For (ii) of consistency suppose that x ∈ f(θ) and x /∈ f(θ′) for some θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
Then, as pi : Θ → Ω∗ we have that pi(θ), pi(θ′) ∈ Ω∗ and due to fΩ∗(pi(θ˜)) = f(θ˜)
for all θ˜ ∈ Θ we have that x ∈ fΩ∗(pi(θ)) and x /∈ fΩ∗(pi(θ′)). As SΩ∗ is consistent




j (x, pi(θ))). By
construction, Sj(x, θ) = S
∗
j (x, pi(θ)). Thus, x /∈ Cpi(θ
′)
j (Sj(x, θ)). Hence, SΘ satisfies
(ii) of consistency.
B.3 The proof of Theorem 2
The proof employs mechanism µ used in the proof of Theorem 1 (involving rules
specified in Table 1). Moreover, every sympathizer at pi(θ) is a weak sympathizer at
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pi(θ). Thus, the proof of Claim 1 can be used without any modifications to prove that
for all θ ∈ Θ and for all x ∈ f(θ), ax ∈ A defined by axi = (S, θ, x, 1) with S ∈ S(f) is
such that axi ∈ BRpi(θ)i (ax−i) for all i ∈ N and g(ax) = x. What remains to be shown is:
Claim 3. If a∗ ∈ A is a Nash∗ equilibrium of µ ∈ M∗ at some θ ∈ Θ, then g(a∗) ∈
f(θ). I.e., a∗ ∈ A such that a∗i ∈ BRpi(θ)i (a∗−i) for all i ∈ N for some θ ∈ Θ implies
g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
Proof. The proof of the claim involves the analysis of three cases.
Case 1. Let a∗ ∈ A be a Nash∗ equilibrium at θ ∈ Θ such that Rule 1 holds. That
is, a∗i = (S
(i), θ′, x′, k′) for all i ∈ N with S(i′) = S for all i′ 6= j for some j ∈ N and
x′ ∈ f(θ′). Then, g(a∗) = x′ ∈ f(θ).
Proof of Case 1. First, we prove that S ∈ S(f). Therefore, in such Nash∗ equilibria,
all but one player announce the same profile of sets that must be among the consistent
profiles of sets with the SCC f .
If S(j) = S, then without loss of generality letting the first player be one of the
sympathizers at pi(θ), we observe the following: If S /∈ S(f), then deviating to a¯1 =
(S¯, θ′, x′, k′) with S¯ ∈ S(f) results in g(S¯,m∗1, a∗−1) = g(S,m∗1, a∗−1) = x′ (due to Rule
1) and x′ ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (a∗−i)) for all i ∈ N (since a∗ is a Nash∗ equilibrium) where
m∗1 = (θ
′, x′, k′). Thus, a∗1 /∈ BRpi(θ)1 (a∗−1), a contradiction to a∗ being Nash∗ at θ.
However, if S(j) 6= S and j is not a sympathizer at pi(θ), then we let without
loss of generality one of the sympathizers at pi(θ) be the first player and assume that








′ (due to Rules 1 and 3) and x′ ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (a∗−i)) for
all i ∈ N (since a∗ is a Nash∗ equilibrium) where m∗1 = (θ′, x′, k′) and m¯1 = (θ′, x′, k¯).
Ergo, a∗1 /∈ BRpi(θ)1 (a∗−1), a contradiction to a∗ being a Nash∗ equilibrium at θ.19
If S(j) 6= S but j is a sympathizer at pi(θ), then we need another sympathizer i∗ 6= j
at pi(θ): Without loss of generality, let that individual be player 1 and assume S /∈ S(f).
19This is why we have to strengthen weak sympathy to sympathy, as the deviating individual has
to change his integer choice as well.
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Then, the same arguments of the previous paragraph delivers a contradiction.20
Suppose that g(a∗) = x′ /∈ f(θ) because otherwise the proof of Case 1 concludes.
Then, x′ ∈ f(θ′) and x /∈ f(θ) and S ∈ S(f) with θ, θ′ ∈ Θ implies (due to (ii) of
consistency) there exists i∗ ∈ N such that x′ /∈ Cpi(θ)i∗ (Si∗(x′, θ′)). There appears two
subcases we need to check. The first is one where a∗ is such that S(i) = S for all
i ∈ N . Then, Oµi (a∗−i) = Si(x′, θ′) (by Rules 1 and 2) and as a∗ is Nash∗ it must be
that x′ ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (a∗−i)) for all i ∈ N . Ergo, the desired contradiction is obtained as
x′ ∈ Cpi(θ)i∗ (Si∗(x′, θ′)). The second subcase that we need to consider is one where a∗ is
such that S(i) = S for all i ∈ N \ {j} for some j ∈ N and S(j) 6= S. Then, by Rules 1
and 2 and 3, Oµi (a
∗
−i) = X for all i 6= j and Oµj (a∗−j) = Sj(x′, θ′) where Sj(x′, θ′) ∈ S
and S ∈ S(f) as was shown above. Because that a∗ is a Nash∗ equilibrium at θ, we
observe that x′ ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X) for all i 6= j while x′ ∈ Cpi(θ)j (Sj(x′, θ′)) and x′ ∈ f(θ′). But
then (i) of Theorem 2 implies x ∈ f(θ), a contradiction with x /∈ f(θ).
Case 2. Consider a Nash∗ equilibrium a∗ at θ in which Rule 2 applies. That is, let
a∗i = (S
(i),m∗i ) with S
(i) = S for all i ∈ N \ {i′} for some i′ ∈ N and m∗j = (θ′, x′, k′)
for all j ∈ N \{`} for some ` ∈ N with θ′ ∈ Θ and x′ ∈ f(θ′) while m∗` = (θ′′, x′′, k′′) 6=
(θ′, x′, k′). Then, g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
Proof of Case 2. The first step is to prove that S ∈ S(f). It should be pointed
out that this establishes the observation that in all Nash∗ equilibria in which Rule 2
applies, all but one individual announce the same profile of sets which has to be one
of the profiles of sets consistent with the SCC f .
Suppose that S /∈ S(f) and notice that there exists a sympathizer at pi(θ) individual
i∗ 6= i′ with S(i∗) = S as there are at least two sympathizers at pi(θ). Without loss of
generality, let i∗ = 1. If S(i
′) 6= S, player 1 deviating to a¯1 = (S¯, m¯1) where S¯ ∈ S(f)
and m¯1 = (θ˜, g(a
∗), k¯) with θ˜ ∈ Θ and k¯ > k′, k′′ implies that Rule 3 applies and












20The need for an additional sympathizer arises due to this case. To see this, suppose that there is
only one sympathizer at pi(θ) and consider the situation when S(j) 6= S and j is the only sympathizer
at pi(θ). Then, S /∈ S(f) does not necessarily result in a contradiction as there is no other sympathizer
at pi(θ) among those who are announcing an inconsistent profile of sets S. Hence, one of the agents
whose opportunity set equals X must be inclined toward truthful revelation of consistency at pi(θ).
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a∗ being a Nash∗ equilibrium at θ. But then, as player 1 is a sympathizer at pi(θ),
a∗1 /∈ BRpi(θ)1 (a∗−1), a contradiction to a∗ being Nash∗. If S(i′) = S, then all players
are announcing S; and hence, player 1 deviating to a¯1 = (S¯,m
∗
1) where S¯ ∈ S(f)















∗ is Nash∗ at θ. However, player 1 being a sympathizer at pi(θ)
implies a∗1 /∈ BRpi(θ)1 (a∗−1), contradicting to a∗ being a Nash∗ equilibrium at θ.
Having established S ∈ S(f), we note the following:
If S(i
′) 6= S, then Oµi (a∗−i) = X for all i 6= i′ (by any one of such i 6= i′ deviating
to S(i) 6= S and choosing the highest integer and any alternative) while Oµi′(a∗−i′) =
Si′(x
′, θ′) if i′ = ` and Oµi′(a
∗
−i′) = X if i 6= ` (by i′ deviating to m′i′ 6= (θ′, x′, k′) and
making Rule 3 apply). Thus, if i′ = `, S ∈ S(f) and a∗ being Nash∗ at θ implying
g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X) for all i 6= i′ and g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i′ (Si′(x′, θ′)) with x′ ∈ f(θ′) enable us to
employ condition (i) of the hypothesis of Theorem 2 and conclude that g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
But if i′ 6= `, then S ∈ S(f) and a∗ being Nash∗ at θ implying g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X) for
all i ∈ N results in g(a∗) ∈ f(θ) due to condition (ii) of the hypothesis of Theorem
2. Observe that when the environment features societal non-satiation and (ii) of the
hypothesis of Theorem 2 is dispensed with, we cannot have a Nash∗ equilibrium a∗ at θ
in which Rule 2 applies and S(i
′) 6= S and i′ 6= `. Because otherwise, g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X)
for all i ∈ N , a contradiction to societal non-satiation.
If S(i
′) = S, then Oµj (a
∗
−j) = X for all j 6= ` (by any one of such j 6= ` deviating
to m′j 6= m∗j) while Oµ` (a∗−`) = S`(x′, θ′) (by Rule 2). Hence, S ∈ S(f) and a∗ being
Nash∗ at θ implying g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)j (X) for all j 6= ` and g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)` (S`(x′, θ′)) with
x′ ∈ f(θ′) and condition (i) of Theorem 2 conduce to g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
Case 3. Let a∗ be Nash∗ at θ under Rule 3. Then, g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
Proof of Case 3. Clearly, Oµi (a
∗
−i) = X for all i ∈ N and g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X) for all
i ∈ N (on account of a∗ being Nash∗ at θ) leads to the conclusion that g(a∗) ∈ f(θ)
thanks to condition (ii) of the hypothesis of the current theorem.
Insisting on societal non-satiation eliminates such Nash∗ equilibria: Oµi (a
∗
−i) = X
for all i ∈ N and g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X) for all i ∈ N result in a contradiction to societal
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non-satiation which requires that there is j ∈ N such that g(a∗) /∈ Cpi(θ)j (X).
These conclude the proof of the Claim 3, and hence, the proof of Theorem 2.
C Two individuals
For reasons of completeness, we present the notion of two-individual consistency, a
necessary condition for Nash implementation with two individuals:
Definition 7. Let n = 2. Given an SCC f : Θ → X , a profile of choice sets
S := (Si(x, θ))i∈{1,2}, θ∈Θ, x∈f(θ) is two-individual consistent with f : Θ→ X if
(i) x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Si(x, θ)), for all i ∈ {1, 2} and θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ); and
(ii) x ∈ f(θ) and x /∈ f(θ′) for some θ, θ′ ∈ Θ implies that either x 6∈ Cpi(θ′)i (Si(x, θ))
or x /∈ Cpi(θ′)j (Sj(x, θ)) for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j; and
(iii) there exists a function e : X × Θ × X × Θ → X such that for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ,
x ∈ f(θ), and x′ ∈ f(θ′)
(iii.1) e(x, θ, x′, θ′) ∈ S1(x, θ) ∩ S2(x′, θ′); and




SII(f) denotes the set of profiles of sets S that are two-individual consistent with f .
In words, a profile S := (Si(x, θ))i=1,2, θ∈Θ, x∈f(θ) is two-individual consistent with
an SCC f : Θ→ X if (i) and (ii) of consistency (Definition 1) along with the following
hold: (iii) for any pair of states and f -optimal alternatives for the corresponding states
(x, θ) and (x′, θ′), we have that (iii.1) there exists a function e mapping this pair into
the intersection of the corresponding choice sets, S1(x, θ) ∩ S2(x′, θ′), such that (iii.2)
the resulting alternative e(x, θ, x′, θ′) is f -optimal at state θ∗ whenever it is chosen at
pi(θ∗) by individuals 1 and 2 from S1(x, θ) and S2(x′, θ′)), respectively. Item (iii) is
novel to the case with two individuals.
Now, for reasons of completeness, we state and prove the corresponding necessity
result discussed in de Clippel (2014).
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Theorem 3. Let n = 2. If an SCC f : Θ→ X is Nash implementable by a mechanism
µ ∈ M, then SII(f) 6= ∅. That is, the existence of a two-individual consistent profile
is necessary for Nash Implementation.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that SCC f : Θ → X is Nash implementable by
a mechanism µ = (g, A) ∈ M. Thus, for any θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ), (by (i) of Nash
implementation) there exists ax ∈ A such that g(ax) = x and x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (ax−i)) for i =
1, 2. For any i = 1, 2 and θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ), define Sµ := (Sµi (x, θ))i={1,2}, θ∈Θ, x∈f(θ)
by Sµ(x, θ) := Oµi (a
x
−i) where a
x ∈ A is such that g(ax) = x and x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (ax−i)).
First, we show that Sµ satisfies (i) and (ii) of Definition 7: notice that for any
i ∈ {1, 2} and θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ) it must be that x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Sµi (x, θ)) as g(ax) = x and
x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (ax−i)) and Sµi (x, θ) = Oµi (ax−i) for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Moreover, for any θ, θ′ ∈
Θ with x ∈ f(θ) but x /∈ f(θ′), there exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that g(ax) /∈ Cpi(θ′)j (Oµj (ax−j))
(because otherwise ax would be Nash at θ′ and by (ii) of Nash implementation x must
be in f(θ′)). Hence, x /∈ Cpi(θ′)j (Sµj (x, θ)).
Let e : X × Θ×X × Θ→ X be such that e(x, θ, x′, θ′) := g(ax1 , ax′2 ) where ax ∈ A
is such that g(ax) = x and x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (ax−i)) for i = 1, 2, and ax′ ∈ A is such that
g(ax
′
) = x′ and x′ ∈ Cpi(θ)j (Oµj (ax′−j)) for j = 1, 2. Then g(ax1 , ax′2 ) ∈ Oµ1 (ax′2 ) ∩Oµ2 (ax1) =










′, θ′)), then g(ax1 , a
x′













This means that (ax1 , a
x′
2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of µ at θ
∗. Hence, by (ii) of Nash
implementation, we must have g(ax1 , a
x′
2 ) ∈ f(θ∗), implying (iii.2) of Definition 7.
The following is a sufficiency result with two individuals using a mechanism that
elicits the relevant information about the societal choice topography from the two
individuals. It can be also regarded as a two-individual robustness check for Theorem 1.
Unsurprisingly, with two individuals the sufficiency conditions become more stringent
as in Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta and Sen (1991), and Dutta and Sen (2012).
Theorem 4. Suppose n = 2, both of the individuals are sympathizers at every pi(θ)
with θ ∈ Θ, the SCC f : Θ→ X is such that SII(f) 6= ∅, and the following hold:
(i) for any S ∈ SII(f), x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Si(x′, θ′)) with θ′ ∈ Θ, x′ ∈ f(θ′), Si(x′, θ′) =
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S |i,x′,θ′, and x ∈ Cpi(θ)j (X) with i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i implies x ∈ f(θ); and
(ii) x ∈ Cpi(θ)1 (X) ∩ Cpi(θ)2 (X) implies x ∈ f(θ); and
(iii) for any S, S˜ ∈ SII(f), S1(x, θ)∩S˜2(x′, θ′) 6= ∅ with θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, x ∈ f(θ), x′ ∈ f(θ′),
S1(x, θ) = S|1,x,θ, and S˜2(x′, θ′) = S˜|2,x′,θ′; and
(iv) for any S, S˜ ∈ SII(f), x∗ ∈ Cpi(θ∗)1 (S1(x, θ))∩Cpi(θ
∗)
2 (S˜2(x
′, θ′)) with θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, x ∈
f(θ), x′ ∈ f(θ′), S1(x, θ) = S|1,x,θ, and S˜2(x′, θ′) = S˜|2,x′,θ′ implies x∗ ∈ f(θ∗).
Then, f is Nash∗ implementable by a mechanism µ ∈ M∗, and for each θ ∈ Θ, in
every Nash∗ equilibrium of µ at θ, each agent announces a profile of sets two-individual
consistent with f .
We show that the hypothesis of this theorem is satisfied in the two-individual ex-
ample we present in Section C.1.
Theorem 4 keeps the hypothesis of Theorem 2: the existence of a profile of sets
two-individual consistent with f and (i) and (ii) along with the need of having at
least two sympathizers at every prevailing state. Even then, the planner has to make
sure that the mechanism elicits the information about the choice topography and the
state; this is no easy task as being a sympathizer does not imply that the agent is
compelled to reveal the realized state and/or refrain from manipulating the outcome
(via announcements of inconsistent profiles) when the mechanism is not designed right.
The rest of the hypothesis of Theorem 4 is specific to the case of two individuals.
An interesting and useful observation concerning the case with two individuals is
about the relation between an individual’s actions and the other’s opportunity sets.
Given mechanism µ = (A, g), any ai ∈ Ai corresponds to Oµj (ai), i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Therefore, individual i choosing action ai can be thought of as offering agent j the
opportunity set Oµj (ai), i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
In the mechanism that we employ to prove Theorem 4, each individual announces
a profile of choice sets. Sympathy ensures that, in equilibrium, each agent announces
a two-individual consistent profile of sets, but not necessarily the same. Consequently,
we obtain hypothesis (iii) of Theorem 4, ensuring that the two-individual mechanism is
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well-defined (under Rule 3 specified in Table 2): because a choice set listed in individual
1’s announcement corresponds to an opportunity set of agent 2 and vice versa, each of
the choice sets of individual 1 listed in any one of the two-individual consistent profile
of sets for agent 1 must have a non-empty intersection with each of the choice sets of
individual 2 listed in any one of the two-individual consistent profile of sets for agent 2.
In other words, hypothesis (iii) of Theorem 4 compels the non-emptiness requirement
of two-individual consistency, specified by (iii.1) of Definition 7, to hold across any
pair of profiles of sets, both two-individual consistent with f .
Item (iii.1) of two-individual consistency implies that there is a selection (function)
identifying the alternative corresponding to the intersection of the actions where the
action of individual i corresponds to the choice set of j listed in i’s announcement,
i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. On the other hand, item (iii.2) ensures that if each of such
alternatives is chosen by both individuals at a state pi(θ∗) from the corresponding
choice sets, then it must be f -optimal at θ∗. Hypothesis (iv) of Theorem 4 strengthens
this requirement by demanding the following: it holds for any alternatives—and not
just for the ones identified by the function specified in item (iii.1)—that are chosen at
some state pi(θ∗) by both individuals from the choice set of individual 1 listed in any
one of the two-individual consistent profile of sets for agent 1 and from agent 2’s choice
set listed in any one of the two-individual consistent profile of sets for individual 2.
Hypothesis (iv) implies that (iii.2) of two-individual consistency holds across any pair
of profiles of sets, both of which are two-individual consistent with f . We may weaken
this requirement a bit further by employing an identification function as is done in
two-individual consistency. This is precisely what is done in Footnote 21. However,
we think the current form of the hypothesis with items (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 4 is
more user friendly.
Items (iii) and (iv) demand the associated requirements hold across any pair of
two-individual consistent profiles of sets. Therefore, they involve slightly stronger
requirements when compared with those implied by the necessary condition, the two-
individual consistency. On the other hand, when there is a unique profile of choice sets
two-individual consistent with the SCC, the alternative hypothesis in Footnote 21 is
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equivalent to two-individual consistency.
Proof of Theorem 4. We employ the following mechanism µ ∈M∗ with µ = (A, g)
defined as follows: Ai equals{
(S(i), θ(i), c(i), x(i), y(i), k(i)) ∈ S∗ ×Θ× {F,NF} ×X ×X × N : x(i) ∈ f(θ(i))} (2)
where a generic member is ai = (S
(i), θ(i), c(i), x(i), y(i), k(i)) with S(i) ∈ S∗ which is
to be defined in the following paragraph, θ(i) ∈ Θ, c(i) ∈ {F,NF} and x(i) ∈ f(θ(i)),
y(i) ∈ X, and k(i) ∈ N with the convention that mi = (θ(i), c(i), x(i), y(i), k(i)) and
Mi := Θ× {F,NF} ×X2 × N.
S∗ consists of profiles of sets in S such that for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ) and x′ ∈
f(θ′), it must be that S1(x, θ) ∩ S2(x′, θ′) 6= ∅ for any S,S′ such that S1(x, θ) = S|1,x,θ
and S2(x
′, θ′) = S′|2,x′,θ′ . Observe that (iii) of the hypothesis of Theorem 4 entails the
implication that SII(f) ⊂ S∗. This coupled with SII(f) 6= ∅ implies that S∗ 6= ∅.
The outcome function g : A→ X is specified via the rules presented in Table 2.21
The proof of Theorem 4 follows from the following: Claims 4 and 5 establish (i)
and (ii) of Nash∗ implementation, respectively (see Definition 4).
Claim 4. Let θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ) and define ax ∈ A by axi = (S, θ, NF, x, x, 1) with S ∈
S(f) and i = 1, 2. Then, ax is a Nash∗ equilibrium of µ at θ, i.e., axi ∈ BRpi(θ)i (axj ) for
i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j, and g(ax) = x.
Proof. Rule 1 applies. Thus, g(ax) = x. Due to Rules 1, 2.1, 2.2, and 3, Oµi (a
x
j ) =
Si(x, θ) with Si(x, θ) = S|i,x,θ and S ∈ SII(f) for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. As i is a
21Hypothesis (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 4 can be replaced with the following slightly weaker condition,
which coincides with (iii) of two-individual consistency whenever there is a unique two-individual
consistent profile of sets, i.e., #SII(f) = 1 (in that case, SII(f) ∈ S∗ follows by definition of two-
individual consistency):
(iii) Suppose that SII(f) ⊂ S∗ and there exists a function e : S∗ ×S∗ ×X ×Θ×X ×Θ→ X such
that for any (S,S′, x, θ, x′, θ′) with S,S′ ∈ S∗ and θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and x ∈ f(θ) and x′ ∈ f(θ′)
(iii.1) e(S,S′, x, θ, x′, θ′) ∈ S′1(x′, θ′)∩S2(x, θ) where S′1(x′, θ′) = S′|1,x′,θ′ and S2(x, θ) = S|2,x,θ;
and
(iii.2) e(S,S′, x, θ, x′, θ′) ∈ Cpi(θ∗)1 (S′1(x′, θ′)) ∩ Cpi(θ
∗)
2 (S2(x, θ)) with θ
∗ ∈ Θ and S′1(x′, θ′) =
S′|1,x′,θ′ and S2(x, θ) = S|2,x,θ implies e(S,S′, x, θ, x′, θ′) ∈ f(θ∗).
Then, modifying the outcome function by requiring g(a) = e(S(1),S(2), x(1), θ(1), x(2), θ(2)) in Rule 3
ensures that the same proof goes through.
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Rule 1 : g(a) = x′ if a1 = a2 = (S′, θ′, NF, x′, y′, k′).
Rule 2.1 : g(a) =

y(1) if y(1) ∈ S1(x(2), θ(2))
and S1(x
(2), θ(2)) = S(2)|1,x(2),θ(2) ,
x(2) otherwise.
if a1 = (S
(1), θ(1), F, x(1), y(1), k(1))
and a2 = (S
(2), θ(2), NF, x(2), y(2), k(2)).
Rule 2.2 : g(a) =

y(2) if y(2) ∈ S2(x(1), θ(1))
and S2(x
(1), θ(1)) = S(1)|2,x(1),θ(1) ,
x(1) otherwise.
if a1 = (S
(1), θ(1), NF, x(1), y(1), k(1))
and a2 = (S
(2), θ(2), F, x(2), y(2), k(2)).
Rule 3 :
g(a) ∈ S1(x(2), θ(2)) ∩ S2(x(1), θ(1))
with S1(x
(2), θ(2)) = S(2)|1,x(2),θ(2)
and S2(x
(1), θ(1)) = S(1)|2,x(1),θ(1) .
if a1 = (S
(1), θ(1), NF, x(1), y(1), k(1))
and a2 = (S
(2), θ(2), NF, x(2), y(2), k(2)).
and a1 6= a2.
Rule 4 : g(a) =
{
x(1) if k(1) ≥ k(2),
x(2) otherwise.
otherwise.
Table 2: The outcome function of the mechanism with two individuals.
sympathizer and S ∈ SII(f), x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Si(x, θ)) (following from (i) of two-individual
consistency) implies axi ∈ BRpi(θ)i (axj ), with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Claim 5. If a∗ ∈ A is a Nash∗ equilibrium of µ ∈M∗ at some θ ∈ Θ, then g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
That is, a∗ ∈ A such that a∗i ∈ BRpi(θ)i (a∗j) for all i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j for some θ ∈ Θ
implies g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
Proof. In what follows, we go over four possible cases:




′, θ′, NF, x′, y′, k′). Then, g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
Proof of Case 1. We first establish that S′ ∈ SII(f). Therefore, in every Nash∗
equilibrium under Rule 1, both of the individuals announce the same profile of sets
that must be two-individual consistent with f .
Suppose S′ /∈ SII(f), and consider a′1 = (S¯,m′1) where S¯ ∈ SII(f) and m′1 =
(θ′, F, x′, x′, 1). Because x′ ∈ f(θ′) by the defining property of A1 given in (2), Rule
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2.1 applies, and using x′ as y(1) with the property that x′ ∈ S1(x′, θ′) with S1(x′, θ′) =
S′|1,x′,θ′ (recall that S′ ∈ S∗ ⊂ S and the defining property of S requires x′ ∈ S1(x′, θ′)













2)) (due to a
∗ being a Nash∗ equilibrium) where m∗1 = (θ
′, NF, x′, y′, k′).
This coupled with S¯ ∈ SII(f) and S′ /∈ SII(f) results in a∗1 /∈ BRpi(θ)1 (a∗2) (as individual
1 is a sympathizer), contradicting to a∗ being Nash∗ at θ.




′, θ′) due to Rules 1 and 2.i and 3 with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Then,
S′ ∈ SII(f) and (by (ii) of two-individual consistency) x′ ∈ f(θ′) and x′ /∈ f(θ) imply
that there exists i = 1, 2 such that x′ /∈ Cpi(θ)i (Si(x′, θ′)); this is equivalent to there
being i = 1, 2 such that x′ /∈ Cpi(θ)i (Oµi (a∗j)) with j 6= i. But this is in contradiction
with a∗ being a Nash∗ equilibrium at θ.
Case 2. Let a∗ ∈ A be Nash∗ at θ ∈ Θ such that Rule 2.1 holds. That is, a∗1 =
(S(1), θ(1), F, x(1), y(1), k(1)) and a∗2 = (S
(2), θ(2), NF, x(2), y(2), k(2)). Then, g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
Proof of Case 2. Observe that by (2), a∗i ∈ Ai implies x(i) ∈ f(θ(i)) for i = 1, 2. Our
first step is to prove that S(2) ∈ SII(f). Suppose not. Consider a′2 = (S¯, m¯2) where












∗ is a Nash∗
equilibrium where m∗2 = (θ
(2), NF, x(2), y(2), k(2)). But as S(2) /∈ SII(f) and individual
2 is a sympathizer, a∗2 /∈ BRpi(θ)2 (a∗1); contradicting to a∗ being Nash∗ at θ.
Before showing g(a∗) must be in f(θ), we wish to prove that S(1) ∈ SII(f) as
well. This establishes that both individuals announce a two-individual consistent
profile of sets, yet not necessarily the same, in every Nash∗ equilibrium under Rule
2.1. Suppose S(1) /∈ SII(f) and consider a′1 = (S¯,m∗1) where S¯ ∈ SII(f) and m∗1 =
(θ(1), F, x(1), y(1), k(1)). So, Rule 2.1 still applies at (a′1, a
∗













∗ is a Nash∗ equilibrium.
Because S(1) /∈ SII(f) and agent 1 is a sympathizer, a∗1 /∈ BRpi(θ)1 (a∗2); a contradiction.




x′ ∈ f(θ′) and S1(x′, θ′) = S(2)|1,x′,θ′ while S(2) is consistent with f , i.e., S(2) ∈ SII(f).
Note that g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)1 (S1(x′, θ′)) follows from Oµ1 (a∗2) = S1(x′, θ′) and a∗ being a
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Nash∗ equilibrium at θ. Moreover, Oµ2 (a
∗
1) = X, which follows from Rules 2.1 and 4.
Thus, g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)2 (X) is due to a∗ being Nash∗ at θ. Therefore, (i) of the hypothesis
of Theorem 4 applies, and we conclude g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
We omit the proof of the case of Nash∗ equilibria under Rule 2.2 due to symmetry.
Case 3. Let a∗ ∈ A be a Nash∗ equilibrium at θ ∈ Θ such that Rule 3 holds. That is,
a∗1 = (S
(1), θ(1), NF, x(1), y(1), k(1)) and a∗2 = (S
(2), θ(2), NF, x(2), y(2), k(2)) where a∗1 6=
a∗2. Then, g(a
∗) ∈ f(θ).
Proof of Case 3. Notice that by (2), a∗i ∈ Ai implies x(i) ∈ f(θ(i)) for i = 1, 2. Let
g(a∗) be an arbitrary member of S1(x(2), θ(2)) ∩ S2(x(1), θ(1)) 6= ∅ with S1(x(2), θ(2)) =
S(2)|1,x(2),θ(2) and S2(x(1), θ(1)) = S(1)|2,x(1),θ(1) where S(1),S(2) ∈ S∗. As we intend to
make use of (iv) of the hypothesis of Theorem 4, we first have to prove that S(1),S(2) ∈
SII(f). Thus, both individuals announce a two-individual consistent profile of sets
(but not necessarily the same) in every Nash∗ equilibrium under Rule 3.
Suppose that S(1) /∈ SII(f) and consider a′1 = (S¯, m¯1) where S¯ ∈ SII(f) and m¯1 =
(θ(1), F, x(1), g(a∗), k(1)). Note that then Rule 2.1 applies and as g(a∗) ∈ S1(x(2), θ(2))
(due to g(a∗) ∈ S1(x(2), θ(2))∩S2(x(1), θ(1))) we have that g(S¯, m¯1, a∗2) = g(S(1),m∗1, a∗2) =





∗ is Nash∗ at θ with m∗1 = (θ
(1), NF, x(1), y(1), k(1)).
Since S(1) /∈ SII(f) and agent 1 is a sympathizer, a∗1 /∈ BRpi(θ)1 (a∗2); contradicting to a∗
being Nash∗ at θ. Showing S(2) ∈ SII(f) involves replicating the arguments presented
in this paragraph for individual 2.
Rules 1, 2.1, and 3 imply Oµi (a
∗
j) = Si(x
(j), θ(j)) with x(j) ∈ f(θ(j)) (due to (2))
and Si(x
(j), θ(j)) = S(j)|i,x(j),θ(j) while S(j) ∈ SII(f), i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Note that
g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Si(x(j), θ(j))) follows from Oµi (a∗j) = Si(x(j), θ(j)), and a∗ being Nash∗ at
θ, for both i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Therefore, (iv) of the hypothesis of Theorem 4 applies,
and we conclude g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
Case 4. Let a∗ be Nash∗ at θ under Rule 4. Then, g(a∗) ∈ f(θ).
Proof of Case 4. It is clear that Oµi (a
∗
j) = X for all i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X) for all i = 1, 2 thanks to a∗ being Nash∗ at θ, which leads to the
conclusion that g(a∗) ∈ f(θ) due to condition (ii) of the hypothesis of the theorem.
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Next, we display that in every Nash∗ equilibrium a∗ under Rule 4 at θ, it must
be that a∗i = (S
(i),m∗i ) with S
(i) ∈ SII(f), i = 1, 2. Suppose S(i) /∈ SII(f). Then,
a′i = (S¯,m
′
i) with S¯ ∈ SII(f) and m′i involves individual i winning the integer game
(i.e., k′ > k(j) with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j) while the prize individual i goes for is g(a∗).
In particular, m′i = (θ







∗) while g(a∗) ∈ Cpi(θ)i (X) for all i, j = 1, 2
with i 6= j thanks to a∗ being Nash∗ at θ. As individual i is a sympathizer, we obtain
the desired contradiction because a∗i /∈ BRpi(θ)i (a∗j), i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
C.1 An example with two individuals
In what follows, we present an example with two rational individuals and a social
goal that seeks compromise; we show that the hypothesis of Theorem 4, as well as the
alternative one presented in Footnote 21, hold. Also, this example exhibits a tangible
setting in which our contributions in terms of information extraction are on display.
Let X = {a, b, c} be the set of alternatives. The set of states of the economy is
equal to Θ = {θ, θ′}. The society is composed of Ann and Bob, who are rational;
their state-contingent individual choices at state θ ∈ Θ are captured by the choice
correspondences, C
pi(θ)
A : X → X and Cpi(θ)B : X → X , which are specified in Table










{a, b, c} {b} {c} {a} {c}
{a, b} {b} {a} {a} {b}
{a, c} {a} {c} {a} {c}
{b, c} {b} {c} {b} {c}
Table 3: Individual choices of Ann and Bob.









B a at θ
′.
The SCC f : Θ→ X the planner seeks to implement without knowing individuals’
state-contingent preferences is defined by f(θ) = {a} and f(θ′) = {b}.22
22This social choice function corresponds to the Rawlsian welfare criterion: the desired alternative
at a state of the economy is one that maximizes the welfare of the worst treated individual at that
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Let us start with condition (i) of Definition 7, i.e., x ∈ Cpi(θ)i (Si(x, θ)), for all i ∈ N











A c and b ∈ Cpi(θ
′)
A (SA(b, θ











B a and b ∈ Cpi(θ
′)
B (SB(b, θ
′)) imply two candidates: {a, b} and {b}.
Next, we check whether or not the above sets satisfy condition (ii) of Definition
7, i.e., x ∈ f(θ) and x /∈ f(θ′) for some θ, θ′ ∈ Θ implies there is j ∈ N such that
x 6∈ Cpi(θ′)j (Sj(x, θ)):
a ∈ f(θ) and a /∈ f(θ′): Hence, either a /∈ Cpi(θ′)A (SA(a, θ)) or a /∈ Cpi(θ
′)
B (SB(a, θ)). This
implies that we cannot have SA(a, θ) = SB(a, θ) = {a} simultaneously. All other
combinations of the listed candidate sets satisfy condition (ii) of Definition 7.
b ∈ f(θ′) and b /∈ f(θ): Thus, either b /∈ Cpi(θ)A (SA(b, θ′)) or b /∈ Cpi(θ)B (SB(b, θ′)). So,
it cannot be SA(b, θ
′) = SB(b, θ′) = {b} simultaneously. Similar to the above, all the
other combinations of the candidates satisfy condition (ii) of Definition 7.
Now, we consider the following implication of condition (iii) of Definition 7: We
must have SA(a, θ) ∩ SB(b, θ′) 6= ∅ and SA(b, θ′) ∩ SB(a, θ) 6= ∅ for a function e :
X ×Θ×X ×Θ→ X to satisfy (iii.1) of two-individual consistency:
SA(a, θ) is either {a, c} or {a}: For SA(a, θ) ∩ SB(b, θ′) 6= ∅, SB(b, θ′) cannot be {b}.
Hence, it must be SB(b, θ
′) = {a, b}.
SA(b, θ
′) is either {b, c} or {b}: For SA(b, θ′) ∩ SB(a, θ) 6= ∅, SB(a, θ) cannot be {a}.
Therefore, we must have SA(b, θ
′) = {a, b}.
That is, we must have SB(b, θ
′) = {a, b} whereas SA(a, θ) is either {a, c} or {a}. This
implies SA(a, θ) ∩ SB(b, θ′) = {a}. On the other hand, SB(a, θ) = {a, b} whereas
SA(b, θ
′) is either {b, c} or {b}. Hence, SA(b, θ′) ∩ SB(a, θ) = {b}. This further implies
that for any function e : X×Θ×X×Θ→ X which satisfies condition (iii) of Definition
7, we must have e(a, θ, b, θ′) = a and e(b, θ′, a, θ) = b. It is straigthforward to show
that such a function will always satisfy condition (iv) of Definition 7.
state. In our example, there is strong disagreement between the individuals: at any prevailing state,
every alternative that is top-ranked by one of the individual is ranked at the bottom by the other.
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Therefore, there are four profiles of sets, denoted by S, S′, S˜, and Sˆ, that satisfy the
two-individual consistency (Definition 7) with our SCC f , i.e., SII(f) = {S,S′, S˜, Sˆ},
and they are specified in Table 4.
S: SA(a, θ) = {a, c} SA(b, θ′) = {b, c} SB(a, θ) = {a, b} SB(b, θ′) = {a, b}
S′: S ′A(a, θ) = {a} S ′A(b, θ′) = {b, c} S ′B(a, θ) = {a, b} S ′B(b, θ′) = {a, b}
S˜: S˜A(a, θ) = {a, c} S˜A(b, θ′) = {b} S˜B(a, θ) = {a, b} S˜B(b, θ′) = {a, b}
Sˆ: SˆA(a, θ) = {a} SˆA(b, θ′) = {b} SˆB(a, θ) = {a, b} SˆB(b, θ′) = {a, b}
Table 4: The two-individual consistent profiles of sets: SII(f) = {S,S′, S˜, Sˆ}.
It is easy to check that the hypothesis of Theorem 4, conditions (i), (ii), (iii), and
(iv) (along with the alternative hypothesis of Theorem 4 defined in Footnote 21), are
satisfied for f with SII(f) = {S,S′, S˜, Sˆ}. Thus, the mechanism described in Table 2
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